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Sexual Orientation and Household Savings: 
Do Homosexual Couples Save More?
* 
 
We analyze how sexual orientation is related to household savings using 2000 US Census 
data, and find that gay and lesbian couples own significantly more retirement income than 
heterosexuals, while cohabiting heterosexuals save more than their married counterparts. In 
a household savings model, we interpret this homosexual-specific differential as due to the 
extremely low fertility of same-sex couples, in addition to the precautionary motives driving 
cohabiting households to save more than married ones. Evidence from homeowners’ ratio of 
mortgage payments to house value exhibits the same pattern of savings differentials by 
sexual orientation and cohabiting status. 
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1.  Introduction 
This paper examines how sexual orientation is associated with household savings, to investigate 
differences in savings behavior across types of couples, i.e., gay, lesbian, heterosexual married and 
cohabiting households, and to further explore same-sex household decision-making. A recent and 
widespread phenomenon across developed countries is the sizable presence of homosexual 
partnerships
1, and the important legal and cultural movement toward providing these households 
with the same rights and status as heterosexuals, e.g., Massachusetts and Spain legalizing same-sex 
marriages in 2004. However, the economic analysis of household behavior is still centered on 
heterosexual families.  
A large body of theoretical and empirical literature analyses heterosexual households’ 
outcomes, focusing on the savings patterns of married couples at different stages of their life cycle 
and comparing them to singles
2 (Blow Browning, Ejrnaes, 2009; Zissimopoulos, Karney and Rauer, 
2008; Browning and Lusardi, 1996; Browning, 2000). Regrettably, there is very little relevant 
theory or evidence on couples’ savings that takes into account the type of relationship (cohabiting 
vs. marriage), or the characteristics of the individuals in the couple, for instance their differential 
lifetime uncertainty (Blow et al., 2009; Browning, Chiappori, Weiss, 2010). In particular, we are 
not aware of any study on sexual orientation and household savings.  
In this first analysis of homosexual couples’ savings decisions, we develop a simple two-
period model of household savings decisions, following Browning et al. (2010), and consider 
differences by gender in survival rates, variation in precautionary motives due to the status of the 
relationship, and role of children. These forces potentially affect couples’ savings and may vary by 
sexual orientation, as same-sex partners share the same gender, are not married (by the year 2000, 
                                                            
1 In the US, they are estimated to be between 2 and 10 percent of the population, most likely around 5 percent of the 
total population over 18 years of age (Smith and Gates, 2001). Other countries such as UK and France exhibit 
comparable estimates (Sells, Wells, Wypij, 1995). 
2 Cohabiting individuals are often disregarded in this type of analysis, or included in the same category as singles, e.g., 
Zissimopoulos, Karney and Rauer (2008). 3 
 
no US state had legalized same-sex marriage) and typically exhibit very low fertility. We then use 
data from the 2000 United States Census and show that homosexual couples significantly own more 
retirement and social security income than heterosexual married or cohabiting couples, also after 
controlling for partners’ ages. Additionally, we estimate higher savings for heterosexual cohabiting 
than for married households. Evidence from home-owners on the ratio of their mortgage payments 
relative to the value of their house confirms the same pattern of savings differentials by sexual 
orientation and cohabiting status.   
Economic studies of same-sex couples present both similarities and differences between 
same-sex and heterosexual households. Black, Sanders, Taylor (2007) assume that families’ 
preferences do not systematically differ by sexual orientation. They instead emphasize the 
differences in biological constraints, affecting homosexuals’ fertility, location, household 
specialization and human capital choices. The similarities in family preferences is also found by 
Jepsen and Jepsen (2002), in terms of positive assortative mating for non-labor and labor market 
traits across all types of couples, even though to a smaller extent for same-sex couples. Becker 
(1991) highlights the disparities between homosexual unions and heterosexual marriages due to the 
lack of difference in comparative advantage between partners and to the presence of 
complementarities. Jepsen and Jepsen (2006), Tebaldi and Elmslie (2006) and Antecol and 
Steinberger (2009) link sexual orientation to partners’ labor supply, in a unitary household 
framework, while Oreffice (2009) finds that gay and lesbian households’ labor supplies are affected 
by bargaining power forces (proxied by partners’ age and non-labor income differences) similarly 
to heterosexual couples. There is also evidence in the literature of persistent wage disparities among 
gay, lesbian and heterosexual workers, with lesbians’ earning significantly more than heterosexual 
women, and gay men earning significantly less than heterosexual men (e.g., Allegretto and Arthur, 
2001, Black, Makar, Sanders, Taylor, 2003, Jepsen, 2007). Finally, Jepsen and Jepsen (2009) and 
Leppel (2007) empirically test home-ownership rates differentials by sexual orientation, showing 4 
 
that the rate for homosexuals is lower than that for married but higher than for opposite-sex 
cohabiting couples, and that gay and lesbian households do not differ in this respect. Nevertheless, 
they do not provide any theoretical decision-making framework with which to interpret these 
findings.  
However, neither of these studies of same-sex couples nor the literature on savings examine 
the role of sexual orientation in household savings choices, which is the focus of the present paper. 
Black et al. (2007), Jepsen and Jepsen (2002), and Oreffice (2009) suggest that family preferences 
and intra-household bargaining do not depend on sexual orientation. We want to analyze and test 
whether this applies to savings decisions as well, comparing homosexual to heterosexual couples 
and their characteristics potentially driving savings behavior. 
We use US Census data for the year 2000, specifically its five-percent sample, which 
provides the most recent largest sample of gay and lesbian partners and their detailed demographic, 
income and home ownership information, along with standard samples of heterosexual individuals. 
These data allow us to identify only members of same-sex couples but not single gays or lesbians. 
This limitation represents a lesser concern here, because our analysis applies to couples. Our 
empirical strategy consists of estimating the effects of being a homosexual rather than a married or 
cohabiting couple, comparing household retirement and social security income, and home-owners’ 
ratio of mortgage payments relative to house value, cross-sectionally among gay, lesbian, and 
heterosexual couples. While the US Census data do not provide any direct consumption variable 
that would more closely fit a theoretical analysis of household savings, retirement and social 
security income for the elderly is the result of household savings throughout the life cycle (Lee, 
2001, Lillard and Weiss, 1997). Moreover, the ratio of mortgage payments to house value reflects 
the couple’s capacity and willingness to save rather than consume (Browning and Lusardi, 1996; 
Zissimopoulos, et al., 2008; Wolff, 1998; Deaton and Paxson, 1994; Lin, Chen and Lin, 2000; 
Hurst, Chin Luoh, Stafford, 1998).    5 
 
Our empirical analysis reveals that same-sex households save more than opposite-sex 
households, controlling for age, education and other socioeconomic characteristics. Specifically, 
both gay and lesbian couples are found to save more than heterosexual cohabiting couples, who in 
turn save more than married couples, all the comparisons being statistically different. This evidence 
is consistent with our interpretation that homosexuals save more than heterosexual individuals since 
they have much fewer children (Browning and Ejrnaes, 2009; Scholz and Seshadri, 2007), and 
possibly a less binding relationship. In particular, we find that gays or lesbians own $5,785 more 
annual retirement and social security income than the average married couple, who in turn owns 
$2,442 less annually than the average heterosexual cohabiting couple. Evidence from the ratio of 
mortgage payments to house value of homeowners exhibits the same pattern of  “savings” 
differentials by sexual orientation and cohabiting status. The channel of sexual orientation can 
explain differences in household savings behavior, in addition to gender and commitment motives. 
Alternative explanations such as discrimination against homosexuals in the savings and 
housing market, differences in life expectancy characterizing homosexual couples, and misreporting 
of unmarried homosexual partners in the 2000 Census sample, are considered. We argue that these 
phenomena cannot consistently explain our results, given our predictions on couples’ savings and 
the corresponding evidence. 
This first study of homosexual couples’ savings behavior presents evidence on retirement 
and social security income and homeownership of a homosexual-specific saving pattern, with 
respect to heterosexual married and cohabiting couples. In spite of our data unavailability of a panel 
dimension and of direct consumption variables, we believe that this analysis is a necessary and 
useful starting point in the economic understanding of homosexual household savings behavior, and 
that these documented differences may inform future policy decision-making targeted at household 
savings, the elderly and homeowners. We show that a sizable demographic group in the population, 
and a relatively new household type, saves more than heterosexual households. 6 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 illustrates the theoretical framework. Section 3 
describes the data and the empirical specification. Section 4 presents the empirical results and the 
sensitivity analysis. Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Theoretical Framework 
We develop a simple two-period model of household savings decisions, following Browning et al. 
(2010). We consider intra-household differences in survival rates, presence of children, and 
precautionary motives, as forces affecting couples’ savings, possibly differently by sexual 
orientation. The question we are addressing is how household savings may depend on sexual 
preferences and through which couples’ characteristics. 
A household is composed of two decision-makers, head and partner (or spouses), each 
having a distinct utility function on consumption. Households are assumed to live up to two periods, 
and to make Pareto-efficient decisions about each member’s consumption. Preferences are egoistic, 
in that one mate’s utility does not depend on the other’s consumption. Let C
i
t for i = h, p denote 
member i’s consumption of a private composite good (whose price is normalized to unity) in period 
t. The utility function of each member is assumed to be the same across periods and across partners, 
i.e.  ) (
i C u , where u is strictly quasi-concave, increasing, and continuously differentiable for i = h, p. 
In period 1, each member has an exogenously given income that we assume to be unity for both
3. 
These incomes are the only source of household income, and in period 2 household income is 
simply what is saved from period 1. All prices are set to unity and the real interest rate to zero. In 
the first period, the household joint expenditure isX1. How this expenditure is transformed into 
consumption and how this consumption is shared between the two people are decisions that we side 
                                                            
3 We abstract from analyzing how differences in income across individuals and types of couples may affect savings 
behavior, as our focus is on more “primitive” characteristics of homosexual and heterosexual couples.  7 
 
step here. Thus, we follow Browning et. al (2010) and assume that there is a linear transformation 
from expenditure to “private-equivalent” consumption and the resulting consumption good is shared 
equally (if both members are alive).  Consequently, the first period per capita consumption is given 
by  μX1whereμ∈ 0.5,1 [] . If μ=1 all consumption is public, i.e. two persons can live as cheaply as 
one, while if μ=0.5 all consumption is purely private. The intermediate case allows for both a 
public and private component. In the second period, the household joint expenditure is X2 and is 
subject to the same scale effects as X1. As the real interest rate is set to zero, the budget constraint is 
simply X2 = (2 − X1). Finally, we abstract from the non-pecuniary benefits of companionship, follow 
convention and assume that the utility from companionship is additive; in particular, it does not 
influence the trade-off between consumption and saving. For ease of exposition, we first employ a 
two-person model with a man and a woman, focusing on heterosexuals as our benchmark, and we 
then characterize the potential differences with respect to gay and lesbian couples. 
 
2.1 Benchmark model 
We take into account each individual’s survival probability, with the woman surviving with 
probability one to the end of period 2, while the man has a probability of survival after the end of 
period 1 equal toλ, with0 < λ <1.  The survival probability is the only source of uncertainty in the 
model, and is gender-specific (after controlling for age, i.e. conditional on being in period 2)
4.  We 
assume that the two agents have preferences that can be represented by a stationary intertemporally 




W = u(μX1)+λu(μX2)+(1−λ)u(X2) 
                                                            
4λ may also capture the degree of risk aversion, the higher theλ  the more risk averse the individual is, consistent with 
the finding that women are more risk-averse than men (gender-specific parameter). 8 
 
where the couple stays together if the husband survives to the second period. Note that we have 
assumed the same sub-utility function  ) (
i
t C u  for each person in each period, and that we do not 
allow for ‘caring’ preferences, so that M does not gain anything from W’s private consumption and 
vice-versa.  However, the scale factor μ can be interpreted as capturing some caring in the sense 
that consumption of the other (when together) raises the value of expenditures. Specifically, this 
factor may capture different levels of commitment and relationship stability, as well as uncertainty 
in terms of entitlement to survivor’s benefits that characterize married versus unmarried couples, 
with higher μfor more stable couples (see subsection 2.3).  
  Agents are assumed to coordinate and reach Pareto-efficient outcomes, in line with the 
collective model assumption (Browning et al., 2010; Chiappori, 1988). We further assume that the 
members of the couple have equal weights in the joint utility function, so that the household 
maximizes the following objective function: 
U =2u(μX1)+2λu(μX2)+(1−λ)u(X2) 
by choosing X1, and subject to the budget constraint X2 = (2 − X1). Solving this maximization 
problem yields the following first order condition (assuming interior solutions): 
2μu
'(μ ˆ  X  1) = 2μλu
'(μ ˆ  X  2)+(1 − λ)u
'( ˆ  X  2) 
which implies that the per capita consumption in the first period is higher than in the second period 
(i.e. ˆ  X  1 > ˆ  X  2), if the consumption good is not fully public (i.e.μ <1), and the couple remains 
together in the second period. Given the budget constraint, it follows that that the couple saves less 
than half of their total income, as it can be seen from the first order condition:  
                                 u
'(μˆ  X  1) = λu




'( ˆ  X  2)                             (1) 
               < λu















'(μ ˆ  X  2) 
≤ u
'(μ ˆ  X  2)⇒ μ ˆ  X  1 > μ ˆ  X  2 
Differently from this heterosexual household benchmark, homosexual couples do not face 
different survival probabilities for each of their members, since both partners share the same gender 
(same   for both).  Therefore, their objective function becomes: 
U =2u(μX1)+2λu(μX2) 
subject to the same budget constraint as above. We consider the same set of preferences of 
opposite-sex couples, without imposing dissimilar utility functions as the channel through which 
sexual orientation may affect savings. The first order condition follows: 
                                   2μu
'(μ ˆ  X  1) = 2λμu
'(μ ˆ  X  2)                               (2) 
u
'(μ ˆ  X  1)
u
'(μ ˆ  X  2)
= λ 
From the first order condition (1), we have that u
'(μ ˆ  X  1) > λu
'(μ ˆ  X  2) for opposite-sex couples, and 
from first order condition (2) we have that u
'(μ ˆ  X  1) = λu
'(μ ˆ  X  2) for gay couples (both members face 
the same uncertain survival probabilityλ <1) and ) ˆ ( ) ˆ ( 2
'
1
' X u X u μ μ = for lesbian couples (both 




























































   with λ <1              (3) 
From equation (3), we get that: μ ˆ  X  1 > μ ˆ  X  2 and thus  ˆ  X  1 > ˆ  X  2 for opposite-sex couples. The same 
holds for gay couples. However, from (3), we can assert that the difference between first period 
expenditure and second period expenditure is lower for heterosexual couples than for gay couples. 
This means that heterosexual couples save more than gay couples. Conversely, lesbian couples save 10 
 
more than heterosexual couples, as the per capita consumption is the same in each period and the 
savings equal half of their total income.  
In summary, households in which both members expect to live with certainty (lesbians) save 
more than households in which one member faces an uncertain survival probability (heterosexuals), 
who in turn save more than households in which both members face uncertain survival (gays). 
These predictions hold provided that the difference across types of couples stems from dissimilar 
survival probability (risk aversion) due to biological gender differences, other characteristics being 
equal or not affecting savings behavior (e.g., conditional on individual ages and incomes). The 
finding that households where women are present save more is consistent with the savings literature 
highlighting that women want to save more than men since they expect to live longer, and be 
widows (e.g. Browning et al., 2010; Browning 2000; Lundberg and Ward-Bratts, 2000).  
The awareness that household members will be able to enjoy savings together in the future 
may give an additional incentive to couples to save more, weighing more the state of the world in 
which both members will survive in the next period. By introducing a multiplicative parameter 
α >1 in the utility of the second period, only when both partners (spouses) are alive, it can be 
shown that this “coincidence of life” encourages all types of couples to save more. Furthermore, for 
same-sex couples the incentive may be higher, since partners share the same gender and 
consequently would not experience widowhood, ceteris paribus.   
We now extend our framework to take into account other couples’ characteristics affecting 
household savings which are likely to differ by sexual orientation. 
 
2.2. Children 
Children play an important role in family life, they represent the main household production output 
(Becker, 1991) and are associated with lower household savings as they are a costly consumption 11 
 
good
5 (Browning and Ejrnaes, 2009; Scholz and Seshadri, 2007; Browning and Lusardi, 1996). 
While these patterns clearly refer to heterosexual households, same-sex couples exhibit a very low 
fertility: an average of .36 children for lesbians and .10 for gays in the US in 2000, according to 
Carpenter and Gates (2008), Jepsen (2007), Oreffice (2009). In fact, they can have children only 
from (previous) heterosexual relationships, through artificial insemination (lesbians) or through 
adoption or “renting a womb”, although the last two options may not be legal across states and 
countries. We include children in our model of couples’ savings decisions, assuming that couples 
may derive utility from the public consumption good c (children), while incurring the expenditures 
related to childrearing (Browning et al., 2010). For simplicity, we assume that consumption of this 
additional good only occurs in the first period, and its price is set to unity.  
The heterosexual couples’ maximization problem in the presence of children is as follows: 
) ( ) 1 ( ) ( 2 ) ( 2 ) ( 2 2 2 1 1 X u X u cX u X u U c λ μ λ μ − + + + =  
with [] c c − − ∈ 1 , 5 . 0 5 . 0 μ , c>0 in the presence of children and c = 0 if no children, and the same 
intertemporal budget constraint as before,  X2 = (2 − X1). We thus assume the same kind of linear 
transformation from expenditure to personal consumption, with the per capita consumption of 
children equal to  1 cX for each member, as children are a public good. The first order condition 







' X u X u c X c u X u c λ μ μλ μ μ − + = + , yielding the following relationship 


































+ =                     (4) 
Note that when the last term in (4) is zero (the couple has no children) the equation is the same as 
(1), so that we can write: 
                                                            
5Children may also represent a potential source of care-giving when parents are old. We do not model this aspect here, 
although we note that this source would generate a further incentive for the household to save less, as additional income 
would be available in the second period. 12 
 
u
'(μˆ  X  1)
u
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          (5) 
One can see that μ ˆ  X  1 > μ ˆ  X  2 and thus  ˆ  X  1 > ˆ  X  2 for heterosexual couples with and without children. 
Additionally, the difference between first period expenditure and second period expenditure is 
higher for opposite-sex couples with children than for those without. This means that heterosexual 
couples with children save less than those without, as it is found in the literature (Browning and 
Ejrnaes, 2009; Scholz and Seshadri, 2007; Browning and Lusardi, 1996). 
Within this setting, we can now compare same-sex to opposite–sex couples’ savings. For 
homosexual couples we have that ) ( 2 ) ( 2 ) ( 2 2 1 1 X u cX u X u U c μ λ μ + + = , so that the first order 





' X u c X c u X u c μ λμ μ μ = + , with  1 = λ  for lesbian couples and  1 < λ for 
gay couples. It follows that ˆ  X  1 > ˆ  X  2 for lesbian couples with children. Given that lesbian couples 
with no children were shown to save half of their income, and that lesbian couples with children 
spend more in the first period, we can assert that lesbian couples with children save less than those 




















































Several interesting implications emerge. First, heterosexual couples with children may save 
less than gay couples without children, not only than lesbian couples. This result comes from 
comparing equations (2) and (4). The formal condition under which this result holds is 






' X c cu X u c <
−λ
, which intuitively means that the marginal utility associated with children 
is larger than the marginal utility of consumption as a widow, weighted by the probability of 
becoming a widow, which seems a realistic requirement (intertemporal trade-off) for couples who 
are willing to have children.  Under these conditions, we would predict that gay couples would save 13 
 
more than heterosexual couples, considering that the former are overwhelmingly childless and the 
latter are those having children. 
Secondly, the presence of children decreases savings for all types of households. As such, 
the fact that homosexual couples have much fewer children than heterosexuals, implies that both 
lesbians and gays are likely to save more than heterosexual couples. Lesbians because they have 
higher survival rates (benchmark model) and fewer children than heterosexual couples, gays 
because they have much fewer children than heterosexual couples, in spite of facing lower survival 
rates (benchmark model).  
 
2.3. Marriage versus Cohabitation  
The lack of legal marriage may act as a precautionary motive encouraging cohabiting couples to 
save more, as married households in the US are found to be more committed and stable than 
cohabiting couples (e.g., Kurdek, 1998). Cohabitants may not be entitled to survivor’s benefits or 
rights on the partner’s pension, and the probability of becoming single is much higher, which may 
generate a lower willingness to consume public goods while in the relationship (Browning et al., 
2010). We can incorporate variations in the level of commitment as changes in the extent of public 
consumptionμ, assuming that the higher the commitment the higher theμ. While we cannot derive 
a general result without further assumptions on the utility functional form, we present some 
qualitative implications. 
From equation (1) we notice thatλ <
u
'(μ ˆ  X  1)
u
'(μ ˆ  X  2)
< λ +
(1 − λ)
2μ .  Note that for a higher value of 
μ the upper limit in the expression above decreases, so that the ratio 
u
'(μ ˆ  X  1)
u
'(μ ˆ  X  2) takes values on a 
narrower interval, and thus could be lower. Higher commitment, i.e. marriage rather than 14 
 
cohabitation, may lead to lower savings.
6 This observation is consistent with simulation results 
reported by Browning et al. (2010), where it is found that a higher degree of publicness in 
consumption decreases savings in the first period. 
With these predictions in mind, we now turn to empirically investigating whether same-sex 
couples exhibit different savings patterns from heterosexual cohabiting and married couples, as 
homosexual couples share the same gender, are not married (by the year 2000, in the US no state 
had legalized same-sex marriage) and typically have very few children. These features represent 
relevant references for our analysis, as children have been found to be associated with lower 
household savings (Browning and Ejrnaes, 2009; Scholz and Seshadri, 2007), while there is mixed 
evidence on precautionary motives and the effect of marriage, with married individuals saving more 
than singles, and retirement being relevant for savings decisions (Browning and Lusardi, 1996; 
Lupton and Smith, 2003). Finally, as wives are typically younger than their husbands, and may be 
more risk averse, they exhibit stronger incentives to save as women live longer than men (Browning 
2000; Browning and Lusardi, 1996; De Nardi et al., 2008). 
 
3. Data Description and Empirical Specification 
Estimation is carried out on US Census data for the year 2000, specifically its five-percent sample 
“5% IPUMS data” (1-in-20 national random sample of the population), which provides the most 
recent largest sample of gay and lesbian partners and their detailed demographic, labor and income 
information, along with standard samples of heterosexual individuals. Unmarried “heads” and 
“unmarried partners”, and a random sample (20 percent) of married “heads” and “spouses” were 
extracted from the Census using the variables “relationship to household head” and “marital status’. 
                                                            
6 If we assume a population of couples for whom r =
u
'(μ ˆ  X  1)
u
'(μ ˆ  X  2)








⎥ and is 
distributed according to a pdf function, then the average r is lower as μ increases.   15 
 
Records in these files were subsequently matched on the household identification code “serial” to 
create a single observation for each couple. Using the variable “sex”, couples with the head and the 
partner sharing the same gender were then identified as same-sex couples, gay and lesbian, and 
those with opposite gender as heterosexual couples. Individuals with imputed values for sex, marital 
status, and relationship to household head were excluded from our main samples. This procedure is 
crucial to extract actual same-sex couples from the 2000 US Census. As documented in Black et al. 
(2006), Jepsen (2007), and in subsection 4.2 below, this method prevents heterosexual couples from 
being recorded as homosexuals, due to a recoding error in the 2000 Census.  In the Census, gays 
and lesbians are identified by their cohabiting relationship, a household being recorded as a same-
sex union if the “relationship to head” is specified as “unmarried partner”, so that single gays or 
lesbians cannot be recovered. This limitation represents a lesser concern here, because our analysis 
applies to couples. However, most economic studies on homosexuals use Census data, of 1990 or 
2000. Others (e.g., Black et al., 2003, Blandford, 2003) use the General Social Survey (GSS) data, 
where single gays and lesbians can be identified. Nevertheless, the homosexual sample size is much 
smaller than in the Census data (around three hundred observations total), and sexual orientation in 
GSS is inferred from self-reported sexual activity, whereas self-reported sexual orientation (Census) 
is regarded as more relevant to study gay and lesbian partnerships (Carpenter and Gates, 2008). 
Our main sample consists of gay and lesbian couples, and married men and women; 
heterosexual cohabiting couples are also considered, as additional comparison group. Dummy 
variables corresponding to these various types of couples are created and used to capture the 
potential differences in savings behavior. All individuals in our samples are not in school, not in the 
military, and not in a farm household. A couple consists of the head of the household and his/her 
unmarried partner, or spouse. A household is included only if both the head and the mate are 
actually present, while those where there are multiple mates, or more than two adults, are excluded. 
The age range varies from 60 to 80 year old for the heads of our elderly households for which we 
analyze their retirement and social security income pattern, and between 25 and 45 for the younger 16 
 
households of home-owners who do not own their residence free and clear yet (and thus pay 
mortgages). We focus on white couples, even though including blacks does not alter our findings. 
Our elderly sample thus consists of approximately 405 observations of same-sex couples, 111,109 
observations of married couples, and 7,863 of heterosexual cohabiting couples. Our young sample 
consists approximately of 2,054 observations of same-sex couples, 87,008 observations of married 
couples, and 14,994 of heterosexual cohabiting couples. These sample sizes are consistent with 
those of previous studies using Census data to analyze and compare homosexual to heterosexual 
households (Black, Sanders, Taylor, 2007; Jepsen and Jepsen, 2002; Jepsen, 2007; Oreffice, 2009).  
We consider two alternative measures of savings as dependent variables, controlling for the 
demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of both partners (spouses), along with a dummy 
variable for sexual orientation. These are the sum of the retirement and social security income of the 
head and the partner (spouse), and the annual mortgage payments (amounts due for first mortgage, 
or first and second mortgage together, with or without property taxes and insurance payments) 
divided by the current value of the house in which the household lives, all expressed in 
contemporary dollars. These variables are believed to capture household savings, as retirement and 
social security income for the elderly is the result of household savings throughout the life cycle 
(Lee, 2001, Lillard and Weiss, 1997), while the ratio of mortgage payments to house value reflects 
the couple’s capacity and willingness to save rather than consume (Wolff, 1998; Deaton and 
Paxson, 1994; Lin, et al., 2000; Hurst, et al., 1998).    
The regressors are the age and the educational level, the latter defined as the number of 
completed years of schooling, of each partner (spouse); the number of household members or of 
each partner’s own children living in the household; and a dummy variable for how recently the 
household moved in the current residence (5 years or less), as a proxy for the duration of the 
relationship. Unfortunately, the Census records only the number of children currently living with 
the head and the partner (spouse), so that this type of variable does not capture an individual’s total 17 
 
number of children, especially for our elderly sample
7. We account for economic conditions 
controlling for the total individual incomes of both heads and partners (spouses) in 1990, creating 
an average individual income in 1990 by state, race, sexual orientation, cohabitation status, age (5-
year brackets) and education (4 groups, high-school dropouts, high school graduates, some college, 
college and college plus), which we merge by these characteristics to our sample in year 2000. As 
our analysis concerns current retirement income and mortgage to house value by different types of 
households, we want to control for “lagged” income as a measure of wealth and income that an 
individual in a given reference group is supposed to have on average. The health status is not 
recorded by the US Census, however disability status along several dimension of impairment 
(ambulatory, cognitive, vision, independent living and work disabilities) is, and as such we 
construct and control for the corresponding dummy variables in our estimation of the elderly 
sample. State dummy variables are included to capture constant differences in retirement, health 
insurance plans and housing markets across geographical areas in the US, such as house prices and 
mortgage rates, and cultural attitudes toward homosexuals and the presence of legal provisions for 
homosexual couples, such as domestic partnerships and civil unions. Clustering at the metropolitan 
level is used (the PUMA area codes have been re-coded to make them unique across states). 
Observations are weighed with the Census individual weights, to make the sample representative of 
the US population and economy. For robustness checks purposes, data by individual age, race and 
gender on the expected number of years left to live in the year 2000 is merged to our samples from 
the National Vital Statistics Reports (CDC, 2002). We then use the absolute value difference of the 
expected years of the head and the partner (spouse) as additional control to account for the number 
of years a couple can expect to spend together. The smaller this difference, the longer the expected 
coincidence of life between partners, and the higher the incentive to save as more time is left for the 
couple to use their savings and enjoy public goods together. This measure may play a role as a 
                                                            
7 A record of the total number of children borne by a woman is available in the Census, but only for women and only 
until 1990. 18 
 
saving motive especially for the elderly sample (De Nardi et al., 2009), and for homosexual 
couples, who share the same gender and thus tend to face more time together ahead of them.  
Tables 1 and 2 present the descriptive statistics for the heads’ and partners’ (spouses’) main 
variables in the elderly and young samples, separately by type of couple. On average, wives are 
younger, almost as educated as men, and their health is similar to their spouses.  Sexual orientation 
and cohabiting status seem to matter for retirement income with elderly married couples owning 
approximately $1,000 less in retirement and social security income than gay couples and $1,000 
more than lesbian ones. Moreover, cohabiting heterosexuals own $4,700 less in retirement and 
social security income than their married counterparts. Also, across samples, the average number of 
children is highest for married couples, lower for cohabiting and lowest for lesbian and gay couples. 
Interesting features arise comparing homosexual to heterosexual homeowners. On average same-
sex couples, especially gay ones, own slightly more expensive houses than heterosexual couples. 
The same pattern holds for the annual mortgage payments contributing to the variation in the ratio 
of annual mortgage to house value variable: within same-sex couples, lesbians exhibit a higher 
mortgage to house value ratio while within the heterosexual group, cohabiting couples pay more in 
mortgage relative to house value than married ones. Finally, in the same-sex samples, gays and 
lesbians on average have similar education levels, earned a similar income in 1990, and their ages 
are also comparable. However, within both gays and lesbian couples, heads own more income than 
their partners, and are slightly more educated and older. 
[Table 1 about here] 






4.1 Main Findings 
In Table 3 we present the results of several regressions where the dependent variable is the 
household retirement and social security income, and the specifications are run on our sample of 
elderly couples. We start by comparing all homosexual couples to married couples (column 1), 
testing whether gay couples are different from lesbian ones in column 2.  We then compare 
homosexual to heterosexual cohabiting households (column 3). We finally estimate the role of 
cohabitation in heterosexual couples only (column 4).  
[Table 3 about here] 
All the specifications show that same-sex households save more than opposite-sex ones, 
controlling for the age, education and other socioeconomic characteristics of each partner (spouse). 
Specifically, homosexual couples own $5,785 more annual retirement income than the average 
married couple (25% more than the average annual retirement income of married couples), and the 
comparison is statistically different. This evidence is consistent with our interpretation that 
homosexuals save more than heterosexual individuals since over their lifetime they have much 
fewer children
8 (Browning and Ejrnaes, 2009; Scholz and Seshadri, 2007), and possibly a less 
binding relationship, since by the year 2000 no US state had legalized same-sex marriages. Married 
couples have been found to own more assets than single or divorced individuals, nevertheless our 
estimates suggest that they save less than same-sex couples.  
Columns 3 and 4 report the same type of specifications as before, but now including 
heterosexual cohabiting couples, identified by an additional dummy variable so that the excluded 
category is married. One can see evidence of higher savings for cohabiting than married couples 
(column 4) and of even higher savings for same-sex than for opposite sex cohabiting households 
                                                            
8 The Census only reports the number of children living in the household, which does not reflect the actual number of 
children of elderly couples, so that our dummy variable for homosexuality would capture this fertility disparity. 20 
 
(column 3). In particular, we find that homosexuals own $3,776 more annual retirement income 
than the average heterosexual cohabiting couple (21% more than the average annual retirement 
income of heterosexual cohabiting couples), who in turn owns $2,442 more income annually than 
the average married household (11% more than the average annual retirement income of married 
couples). This evidence illustrates that the lack of legal marriage cannot represent the main factor 
driving the disparity by sexual orientation. The fact that cohabiting couples regardless of their 
sexual orientation appear to save more than married ones suggests that lack of legal marriage 
encourages couples to save more (precautionary motive for less stability), but at the same time 
shows that cohabitation is not the main reason why we find that same-sex households save more 
than the corresponding heterosexual ones, and that other forces must be at play, for instance 
fertility. As to the other covariates, most parameter estimates are comparable to the literature. More 
educated partners (spouses) own more retirement income, as well as older couples, with age of head 
having a stronger impact than age of partner. Individuals with disability own lower income, and the 
number of household members decreases the available income for retirement.  
We acknowledge that homosexual individuals may be characterized by different attitudes 
toward retirement and that in the US Census the children variable does not allow us to determine 
the total fertility of each individual but only the number of children currently residing in the 
household, which is very low in the elderly sample. However, the above empirical evidence fits 
well the predictions of our household savings model which incorporates differences in survival 
rates, commitment, and fertility to play a role in couples’ savings decisions. We now turn to our 
sample of young couples between 25 and 45 years of age, for whom the number of children present 
is likely to reflect their actual fertility, and specifically to homeowners who do not own their 
residence free and clear yet.  
[Table 4 about here] 
Table 4 reports the same regression specifications as in Table 3, but now the dependent 21 
 
variable is the ratio of mortgage payments to house value and additional controls for number of 
children and labor income of head and partner are included. All these specifications confirm the 
existence of a significant “savings” differential by sexual orientation and cohabiting status. Being 
homosexual significantly increases the ratio by 2.6 units, corresponding to about 4% of the average 
ratio in the sample (column 1). Column 2 highlights a difference between gay and lesbian couples 
in our young sample. Lesbians appear to save 5.5 units more than heterosexual married couples, 
while gay households save 5.3 units less. We interpret this disparity within our benchmark 
framework according to which two women may save more than one man and a woman, who in turn 
may save more than two men due to different survival rates and degree of risk aversion, controlling 
for number of children. Finally, education negatively affects this ratio, reflecting the fact that 
among young couples, the more educated are likely to have fewer savings as high education is 
costly and takes time to achieve; the age of the head is also negatively related to our ratio even 
though the impact is negligible, as it is the case for the head’s labor income and the number of 
children. Columns 3 and 4 report the same type of specifications as before, but now heterosexual 
cohabiting couples are also included. This evidence of higher savings for cohabiting than married 
couples (column 4) confirms our previous findings on the elderly sample, which illustrates once 
again the fact that the lack of legal marriage cannot represent the main factor driving the savings 
disparity by sexual orientation. Conversely, there does not seem to be any difference among same-
sex cohabiting and opposite-sex cohabiting households (column 3), indicating that among those 
young couples who decided to be homeowners while cohabiting, sexual orientation may not play a 
role in mortgage payments if we control for fertility.  
We now focus our attention to couples that do not have children, to further investigate the 
role of fertility in the homosexual savings differential. Table 5 shows that overall this homosexual 
differential disappears when comparing homosexual to heterosexual couples without children 
(column 1), lending support to our argument that the very low fertility of same-sex couples is the 22 
 
main reason why homosexual couples save more. Furthermore, we find that lesbians save more than 
heterosexual married who save more than gays (column 2), consistently with the predictions of our 
theoretical model. As gay couples are formed by two men, who in general save less than women 
because of risk aversion and/or shorter life span (Browning et al., 2010), they may save less than 
heterosexual and lesbian households. These findings relate also to the previous results in Table 4 
including all young couples, in that this disparity of gay and lesbians with respect to heterosexuals 
is smaller when the fertility channel is cut off. Indeed, in Table 5 the corresponding dummies 
exhibit a lower coefficient. Comparing these results to our estimates concerning the elderly sample 
(Table 3) suggests that the fertility differential among all these types of couples plays a more 
important role later in life, when the lifetime impact of children is felt, than in the savings decisions 
of young households. 
 [Table 5 about here] 
Table 6 presents additional estimates of the homosexual differential for elderly households, 
using the same specification as in Table 3 but now also controlling for the absolute difference in 
expected lifetime between head and partner, and then restricting same-sex couples to never married 
homosexuals. The estimated coefficient for the dummy variable identifying same-sex households 
remains positive significant, with a similar magnitude to the corresponding one estimated in Table 
3.    
[Table 6 about here] 
The point estimates in Columns 1 and 2 show that our main finding of higher savings 
associated to same-sex couples is robust to the inclusion of the absolute intra-household difference 
in expected lifetime, with a similar magnitude of about $5,700 (column 1). This result reinforces 
our interpretation that homosexual couples save more than heterosexual ones not simply because 
they share the same gender and thus their future expected time together. Moreover, this lifetime 23 
 
differential is estimated to be a significant determinant of savings, with its negative significant 
coefficient suggesting that the more far apart the partners are in terms of coincidence of future life, 
the lower are their savings. If instead partners could share their remaining lifetime together, they 
would have the incentive to save more to enjoy future consumption jointly. In the savings literature 
the fact that women tend to live longer than men has received a lot of attention (De Nardi, French, 
Bailey Jones, 2009; Browning and Lusardi, 1996), although a control for intra-household 
differences in expected lifetime is usually absent in these empirical studies. Interestingly, we do 
find a negative significant effect of age difference on savings, as predicted by household bargaining 
(Lundberg and Ward-Batts, 2000): the older the wife, the more bargaining power she has and the 
more she wants to save. Our contribution here is that we are also accounting for intra-household 
differences in expected lifetime together, which allows us to disentangle the bargaining power 
effect (age difference) from the influence that different life spans between partners (spouses) can 
have on their willingness to save for future joint consumption. In particular, the insignificant impact 
of the age difference that Lundberg and Ward-Batts (2000) find could be due to its capturing both 
lifetime differences and bargaining power. Our interpretation is reinforced by the fact that we do not 
find any impact of the age difference on retirement income in our subsample of same-sex couples 
(column 2). Homosexual partners share the same gender and bargaining power would not make the 
couple save more or less, since their gender-specific incentives and preferences for savings 
coincide. This is in stark contrast with heterosexual couples, where female spouses save more when 
they have more bargaining power because of gender-specific attitudes toward savings that differ 
from their male spouses’ (Lundberg and Ward-Batts, 2000).  
Focusing on homosexual partners who have never been heterosexually married allows us to 
exclude those who have shared some heterosexual life history with the married in terms of fertility 
and marital commitment. We find that the estimated homosexual savings differential is enhanced, 
by about $3,000, emphasizing their very low fertility (columns 3 and 4). Since until 2002 no US 24 
 
state legalized same-sex marriages, a previous marriage is heterosexual and we use the variable 
marital status to identifying heads or partners who are separated, divorced or widowed. As our 
sample is at least 60 years old and in the past infertility treatments were not available and adoption 
by same-sex couples was not allowed, these never married homosexuals are very unlikely to have 
children, which can explain the higher savings difference of this subgroup with respect to 
heterosexual married households.  
This is the first analysis of homosexual couples’ savings behavior, and our empirical 
evidence on retirement income and mortgage to house-value supports a homosexual-specific saving 
pattern, relatively to heterosexual married and cohabiting couples. Our theoretical framework 
encompassing the main channels driving savings decisions, along with our estimates of two 
separate measures of savings in the elderly and young samples, indicate that homosexuals’ (lack of) 
children seems to be a very important factor keeping their savings higher than heterosexual married 
and cohabiting couples, while commitment and relationship stability can be ruled out as the main 
explanatory variable. However, we recognize that our data unavailability of a panel dimension and 
of direct consumption variables does not allow us to individually disentangle the various forces and 
characteristics driving this differential savings pattern.  
 
4.2 Sensitivity Analysis 
Our results are robust to controlling for age and education squared, presence of grandchildren, self-
employment status. Exclusion of the observations associated with the top 1 or 5 percent of the 
distribution of our dependent variables does not alter our findings. We also perform our estimation 
changing the age thresholds, from 60 to 75 years old for the elderly sample, and from 30 to 45 years 
old for the young sample; here too, results yield the same pattern of associations between 
homosexuality and the retirement income and mortgage ratio. The same can be said when using the 25 
 
log of the income variables, or alternative measures of the mortgage ratio including only first 
mortgages, or excluding the property tax and insurance payments. 
Using house value as dependent variable for the specifications run in our elderly and young 
samples yields a distinctive pattern of results (columns 1 and 2 of Table 7). In both samples, now 
gay and lesbian couples exhibit a different behavior, with gay households owning more expensive 
houses than lesbian and married couples. Conversely, lesbians own cheaper houses than married 
couples. House value represents an important form of saving for old age, and a large component of 
household wealth (the largest for the elderly). Our estimated homosexual-specific house value 
differentials are in line with Jepsen and Jepsen (2009) and Leppel (2007). Using the same US 
Census 2000 data, they empirically tests home-ownership rates differentials by sexual orientation, 
and find that the homosexual households’ rate of ownership is lower than for married but higher 
than for opposite-sex cohabiting couples. Jepsen and Jepsen (2009) also show that the house value 
is higher for gay couples than for married ones (although controlling for metropolitan area fixed 
effects makes their difference insignificant), whereas lesbian couples own houses of lower value 
than married ones. However, the authors do not provide any theoretical decision-making framework 
with which to interpret their findings, with no link to savings decisions. We show that this 
differential pattern across gays and lesbians holds also when controlling for metropolitan area fixed 
effects, and we are able to interpret these findings in terms of savings behavior. Our analysis and 
various estimates of couples’ savings and of the homosexual-specific differential point to the fact 
that household savings, including house value, follow a different pattern from home-ownership 
rates, and do not exhibit evidence of discrimination. 
[Table 7 about here] 
Columns 3 and 4 report our main estimates of the homosexual savings differential, now 
including black couples in our samples of elderly and young households. The estimated coefficient 
for our indicator of same-sex couples is still positive significant in both samples, for retirement 26 
 
income and mortgage to house value ratio, although the magnitudes of the estimated coefficients are 
lower than for whites only. Additionally, the dummy variable for black, while insignificant in the 
elderly sample, is very positive significant in the young sample, possibly due to racial 
discrimination in the mortgage market.  
As to alternative explanations to our findings of higher savings for same-sex couples, we 
argue that the following phenomena cannot consistently explain our results, given our predictions 
on couples´ savings and the corresponding evidence presented so far. The estimated same-sex 
couples’ differential could be due to discrimination by sexual orientation in the savings and housing 
market, as there is evidence of discrimination in the labor market for gay workers and a premium 
for lesbians with respect to their heterosexual counterparts (e.g. Allegretto and Arthur, 2001, Black, 
Makar, Sanders, Taylor, 2003, Jepsen, 2007). However, discrimination would lead to lower savings 
by same-sex couples relatively to the non-discriminated opposite-sex couples, not to the positive 
differential we consistently find in our analysis. Retirement income on one hand, and mortgage to 
house value ratio on the other, would be lower as a consequence of adverse conditions in the credit, 
labor and pension plan market, and would likely exhibit a different pattern between gay and lesbian 
individuals, as it is the case for labor market discrimination. In particular, Jepsen and Jepsen (2009) 
find that homosexual households have the same probability to have a mortgage than heterosexual 
ones. Finally, we control for state fixed effects and cluster standard errors by metropolitan area, 
which should take into account geographic variation in cultural attitudes toward homosexuals.  
Possible health differences between same-sex and opposite sex couples should not invalidate 
our estimated sexual orientation differential and its interpretation. In fact, the scant available 
evidence on the health status of homosexuals (no federal health survey includes a question on 
sexual orientation) points toward worse homosexual health, especially for young gay men mainly 
due to AIDS and STDs (Healthy People, 2010), even though the 2009 Massachusetts report on 
homosexual health shows that “the  health  of  lesbian,  gay  people  is  comparable  to  that  of 27 
 
  heterosexual   respondents” (Landers, Gilsanz, 2009). Our main sample of elderly homosexual 
couples and our young couples aged 25 to 45 should not suffer from poorer health, also because the 
AIDS health differential is found to fade away after age 30 (Frisch, Bronnum-Hansen, 2009). 
Additionally, the supposed lower access to health care and insurance, and the higher exposure to 
viral or cancer diseases (Krehely, 2009) should have lead the homosexual population to save less 
and have less income available at retirement and for mortgage payments, which is exactly the 
opposite of what we find.  
Very recently, Alexander, Davern and Stevenson (2010) argue that US Census IPUMS data 
are not appropriate to run age and sex-specific population estimates for individuals older than 65, 
especially due to missing old women. At the same time, they state that the data are accurate if 
grouped in one age category of 65 and above, and most importantly if the estimation does not focus 
on variables that vary by age. We believe that this pattern does not provide a plausible alternative 
explanation for our findings. Our main variable of interest is a dummy variable for sexual 
orientation which does not vary by age, and we focus on couples obtained by matching heads and 
partners (spouses), so that if women are missing, men would be missing as well and they would not 
be in our sample. Also, we consider one category of 60 and above, and also a younger age group 
which provides the same pattern of results.     
Finally, there is a concern that the homosexual couples under analysis may not be same-sex 
households. The Census identifies same-sex partners by their cohabiting relationship with an 
unmarried individual of the same gender who records his/her “relationship to household head” as 
“unmarried partner”. Unfortunately, the 2000 Census modified the relationship to head from 
“spouse” to “unmarried partner”, and/or the marital status from married to unmarried, for couples 
with both mates of the same sex, without signaling the allocated values in the flag variable of 
relationship to head. As documented in Black et al. (2006), this procedure leads to consider several 
heterosexual married couples as same-sex couples who wrongly reported their sex or relationship to 28 
 
head. To avoid misclassifying heterosexual couples as homosexual ones, Black et al. (2006) and 
Jepsen (2007) suggest that individuals with imputed values for “marital status”, “sex”, and 
“relationship to household head” are excluded from the ‘homosexual’ samples, using the 
corresponding “q” variables which flag allocated values. We follow this well-established procedure 
to ensure that the same-sex couples at stake are real homosexual partnerships, rather than 
heterosexuals misreporting their gender or relationship to head, although homosexuals who wrongly 
identify themselves as married are also dropped (by year 2000, no US state had legalized same-sex 
marriages). The concern that sentimentally un-related individuals voluntarily identify themselves as 
unmarried partners (rather than roommates) is minimal, given the stigma attached to homosexuality. 
However, all these instances of mis-reporting would work against our findings of significantly 
higher savings in same-sex couples, as the presence of heterosexual families in our homosexual 
sample would lead to a statistically insignificant differential. Older homosexuals may be more 
reluctant to identify themselves as such, so that our same-sex couples may be a subsample of the 
actual couples in the population. However, there is no reason why declaring to the Census to be in a 
homosexual partnership should be related to savings propensity. Finally, sexual orientation is 
inferred from self-reported data and under-reporting of homosexual status (identifying as 
“unmarried partner”) may be correlated with demographic characteristics such as education and 
income. At any rate, there is no reason why misreporting is more severe in the Census than in the 
other smaller data sets with information on homosexuals, such as the GSS.  
 
5. Conclusions 
We analyze same-sex household decision-making, documenting how the savings of gay and lesbian 
couples are higher than those of heterosexual ones. Using 2000 US Census data, we find that 
homosexuals own $5,785 more annual retirement and social security income than the average 
married couple, who in turn saves $2,442 less annually than the average heterosexual cohabiting 29 
 
couple. In a simple two-period household savings model, we interpret our findings in terms of a 
differential effect of sexual orientation on household savings patterns, which may be due to the 
extremely low fertility that this demographic group exhibits. The fact that cohabiting couples, 
regardless of their sexual orientation, appear to save more than married ones suggests that lack of 
legal marriage encourages couples to save more (precautionary motive), but at the same time shows 
that cohabitation cannot represent the main reason why same-sex households save more than the 
corresponding heterosexual ones. Evidence from homeowners on the ratio of their mortgage 
payments relative to the value of their house is consistent with the existence of this savings 
differential by sexual orientation and cohabiting status, also for young households. 
The role of sexual orientation in household savings choices had not yet been explored in the 
literature. This first study shows that a sizable demographic group in the population, and a relevant 
new household type, saves more than heterosexual households, presenting empirical evidence on 
retirement and social security income and homeownership supporting a homosexual-specific saving 
pattern, relatively to heterosexual married and cohabiting couples. Our analysis could be a useful 
tool in the economic understanding of this demographic group, and inform future policy decision-
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Table 1: Summary Statistics for Elderly Couples
              Heads                Partners              Heads                 Partners
Variable mean  std. dev mean  std. dev mean  std. dev mean  std. dev
Retirement & SS Income 21,938 24,890 21,938 24,890 24,057 36,114 24,057 36,114
Age 65.37 5.47 58.12 10.27 65.92 5.22 55.10 10.60
Education 14.52 2.89 14.86 2.93 15.18 2.81 14.26 2.41
Household Size 2.18 0.66 2.18 0.66 2.06 0.29 2.06 0.29
# of Children Present 0.09 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.21 0.02 0.19
Disability 0.09 0.29 0.06 0.23 0.05 0.23 0.05 0.21
Dummy Move 0.23 0.43 0.23 0.43 0.38 0.49 0.38 0.49
Total Income 40,081 45,662 34,399 35,312 67,617 79,109 37,337 54,391
Total Income 1990 59,952 39,828 39,349 21,063 63,688 32,101 35,676 16,146
Life Expectancy Diff 7.32 6.43 7.32 6.43 9.21 7.25 9.21 7.25
Number of observations* 141 141 264 264
              Male Mates                 Female Mates             Husbands
Variable mean  std. dev mean  std. dev mean  std. dev mean  std. dev
Retirement & SS Income 18,183 21,974 18,183 21,974 22,860 25,108 22,860 25,108
Age 67.01 5.57 59.81 9.78 68.52 5.78 65.24 7.97
Education 12.45 2.96 12.58 2.20 12.81 2.92 12.60 2.17
Household Size 2.07 0.36 2.07 0.36 2.26 0.68 2.26 0.68
# of Children Present 0.05 0.28 0.07 0.33 0.179 0.480 0.179 0.480
Disability 0.10 0.30 0.09 0.29 0.10 0.30 0.09 0.29
Dummy Move 0.36 0.48 0.36 0.48 0.21 0.41 0.21 0.41
Total Income 36,674 49,054 26,373 34,271 45,172 55,910 16,047 25,396
Total Income 1990 40,261 21,598 24,453 12,900 50,100 22,391 15,109 7,057
Life Expectancy Diff 9.05 6.52 9.05 6.52 5.59 4.12 5.59 4.12
Number of observations* 7,863 7,863 111,109 111,109
Data from the U.S. Census year 2000, five percent sample of the Public Use Microdata Set (PUMS). 
Disability refers to mobility limiting disability.
Dummy Move In is equal to 1 if resident moved in the house in the last five years.
*For couples whose head is between 60 and 80 years of age.   
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Table 2: Summary Statistics for Young Couples
              Heads                Partners              Heads                 Partners
Variable mean  std. dev mean  std. dev mean  std. dev mean  std. dev
Mortgage/House Value** 72.97 31.94 72.97 31.94 67.92 36.21 67.92 36.21
House Value 184,065 147,216 184,065 147,216 251,011 206,174 251,011 206,174
Total Annual Mortgage 11,691 7,691 11,691 7,691 14,709 11,220 14,709 11,220
Age 38.64 3.73 37.89 4.02 38.73 3.87 37.70 4.01
Education 15.21 1.98 14.85 2.16 15.23 1.95 14.69 2.10
# of Children Present 0.33 0.72 0.07 0.31 0.06 0.37 0.00 0.08
Labor Income 47,947 47,730 39,529 42,754 62,884 65,516 43,920 46,920
Dummy Move 0.66 0.48 0.66 0.48 0.69 0.46 0.69 0.46
Total Income 54,427 52,846 44,637 47,549 73,429 71,278 49,276 50,374
Total Income 1990 35,739 16,128 28,764 12,732 36,512 17,645 28,819 13,219
Life Expectancy Diff 3.59 2.88 3.59 2.88 3.46 2.84 3.46 2.84
Number of observations* 1,037 1,037 1,017 1,017
              Male Mates                 Female Mates             Husbands
Variable mean  std. dev mean  std. dev mean  std. dev mean  std. dev
Mortgage/House Value** 79.82 52.33 79.82 52.33 72.78 37.80 72.78 37.80
House Value 140,411 114,791 140,411 114,791 184,040 144,123 184,040 144,123
Total Annual Mortgage 9,468 6,648 9,468 6,648 11,649 7,877 11,649 7,877
Age 37.75 4.31 36.92 4.36 38.68 4.08 37.29 4.13
Education 13.36 1.73 13.37 1.94 14.15 2.02 14.00 2.03
# of Children Present 0.40 0.85 0.61 0.95 1.86 1.12 1.86 1.12
Labor Income 40,278 39,687 28,843 27,918 57,416 56,855 22,104 29,427
Dummy Move 0.63 0.48 0.63 0.48 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
Total Income 45,688 43,804 32,438 30,026 64,716 62,575 24,429 31,999
Total Income 1990 29,387 9,766 20,042 7,887 40,532 13,257 17,519 6,546
Life Expectancy Diff 5.71 3.58 5.71 3.58 5.72 2.69 5.72 2.69
Number of observations* 14,994 14,994 87,008 87,008
Data from the U.S. Census year 2000, five percent sample of the Public Use Microdata Set (PUMS). 
Dummy Move In is equal to 1 if resident moved in the house in the last five years.
The total annual mortgage is net of property taxes and insurance costs, and includes second mortgages.
*For couples between 25 and 45 years of age that own a home and are paying mortgage.   
**Ratio of the total annual mortgage to house value times 1000. 
Wives
Lesbian Couples Gay Couples


















(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dummy for Homosexual 5785.02*** 4715.35** 3775.83** --
(1859.28) (2132.96) (1827.96)
Dummy for Gay -- 1643.42 -- --
(3349.20)
Dummy for Cohabiting -- -- -- 2442.26***
(332.32)
Age of Head 775.33*** 775.15*** 828.40*** 767.48***
(19.93) (19.93) (59.85) (18.97)
Age of Partner 437.74*** 437.98*** 477.07*** 456.43***
(14.78) (14.84) (33.04) (12.79)
Education of Head 621.43*** 621.41*** 691.74*** 645.81***
(62.31) (62.31) (125.54) (58.78)
Education of Partner 1441.79*** 1440.96*** 1093.74*** 1298.91***
(99.84) (100.02) (207.36) (78.49)
Household Size -629.65*** -629.14*** -804.05 -622.77***
(113.71) (114) (516) (112)
Disability of Head -1754.59*** -1754.02*** -1656.58**  -1793.17***
(227.47) (227.50) (646.56) (217.53)
Disability of Partner -1144.91*** -1145.07*** 131.34 -1070.06***
(249.99) (249.99) (876.53) (241.66)
1990 Income of Head  0.176*** 0.176*** 0.040*   0.163***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
1990 Income of Partner -0.254*** -0.254*** -0.05 -0.190***
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
Dummy Move In 633.71*** 632.71*** 225.61 593.80***
(208.25) (208.30) (571.24) (195.65)
Number of Observations 111,514 111,514 8,268 118,972
Estimated coefficients, S.E. (in paranthesis) clustered by recoded PUMA.
* ; ** ; *** significant at 10 %, 5%, 1 %. 
Regressions run with the covariates described in Section 3. 
Table 3: Effects of Being Homosexual versus Heterosexual Married and Cohabiting on 

















(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dummy for Homosexual 2.594** 5.444*** -0.70 --
(1.06) (1.27) (1.12)
Dummy for Gay -- -5.345*** -- --
(1.80)
Dummy for Cohabiting -- -- -- 5.469***
(0.64)
Labor Income of Head -0.00004*** -0.00004*** -0.00006*** -0.00004***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Labor Income of Partner 0.00001 0.00001* -0.00005*** 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
No. Children Head -1.09 -1.79 1.218**  0.41
(1.24) (1.27) (0.58) (0.37)
No. Children Partner 0.87 1.57 0.41 -0.55
(1.25) (1.27) (0.55) (0.38)
Age of Head -0.507*** -0.507*** -0.13 -0.475***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.14) (0.08)
Age of Partner -0.08 -0.08 -0.09 -0.07
(0.05) (0.05) (0.14) (0.05)
Education of Head -11.07*** -11.07*** -15.78*** -12.18***
(1.35) (1.35) (3.61) (1.34)
Education of Partner -2.44*** -2.44*** -4.183**  -3.039***
(0.81) (0.81) (1.95) (0.79)
1990 Income of Head  0.00 0.00 -0.00008*   0.00004*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
1990 Income of Partner -0.00015*** -0.00015*** -0.0001 -0.00022***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Dummy Move In -1.409*** -1.405*** 4.02*** -0.575*
(0.31) (0.31) (0.93) (0.30)
Number of observations 89,062 89,062 17,048 102,002
Estimated coefficients, S.E. (in paranthesis) clustered by recoded PUMA.
* ; ** ; *** significant at 10 %, 5%, 1 %. 
Regressions run with the covariates described in Section 3. 
Table 4: Effects of Being Homosexual versus Heterosexual Married and Cohabiting on Ratio 



















(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dummy for Homosexual 1.082 3.844** -0.183 --
(1.27) (1.51) (1.26)
Dummy for Gay -- -4.829** -- --
(1.87)
Dummy for Cohabit -- -- -- 3.274***
(1.04)
Labor Income of Head -0.00004*** -0.00004*** -0.00005*** -0.00004***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Labor Income of Partner -0.00002** -0.00002**  -0.00004*** -0.00003***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Age of Head -0.416*** -0.412*** -0.361** -0.571***
(0.13) (0.13) (0.17) (0.16)
Age of Partner -0.13 -0.14 0.29 0.14
(0.12) (0.12) (0.18) (0.12)
Education of Head -19.036*** -19.033*** -18.930*** -20.097***
(3.15) (3.15) (4.70) (3.12)
Education of Partner -2.45 -2.42 -7.759** -4.627*  
(2.85) (2.85) (3.33) (2.60)
1990 Income of Head  0.00001 0.00001 -0.00005 0.00008
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
1990 Income of Partner -0.00003 -0.00002 -0.00012 -0.00025***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Dummy Move In -0.75 -0.74 3.557*** 1.530*  
(0.87) (0.87) (1.21) (0.79)
Number of observations 13,109 13,109 8,291 17,944
Estimated coefficients, S.E. (in paranthesis) clustered by recoded PUMA.
* ; ** ; *** significant at 10 %, 5%, 1 %. 
Regressions run with the covariates described in Section 3. 
Table 5: Effects of Being Homosexual versus Heterosexual Married and Cohabiting on Ratio of 















Dummy for Homosexual 5689.56*** -- 8695.93***
(1858.64) (3165.58)
Life expectancy difference -175.80*** -278.42 -181.44***
(47.66) (393.24) (47.85)
Age Difference -322.54*** -56.36 -316.43***
(34.61) (248.61) (34.74)
Age of Head 1194.21*** 1286.51*** 1192.75***
(18.67) (340.44) (18.67)
 Education of Head 609.05*** 2681.95*** 577.59***
(62.27) (806.96) (62.24)
Education of Partner 1468.08*** 2181.82**  1519.56***
(99.81) (911.55) (97.53)
Household Size -612.04*** -2815.22 -612.42***
(113.75) (1955.17) (113.96)
Disability of Head -1755.20*** 1701.75 -1772.81***
(227.49) (5924.05) (227.84)
Disability of Partner -1106.01*** 762.15 -1110.91***
(250.03) (5868.79) (250.39)
1990 Income of Head  0.178*** 0.00336 0.183***
(0.01) (0.07) (0.01)
1990 Income of Partner -0.265*** -0.07219 -0.287***
(0.03) (0.19) (0.03)
Dummy Move In 651.52*** -2201.65 662.32***
(208.42) (3771.97) (208.51)
Number of observations 111,514 405 111,302
Estimated coefficients, S.E. (in paranthesis) clustered by recoded PUMA.
* ; ** ; *** significant at 10 %, 5%, 1 %. 
Regressions run with the covariates described in Section 3. 
Table 6: Effects of Being Homosexual & Never Married Homosexual versus Heterosexual 




Young Sample Elderly Sample
Elderly Sample  
(Blacks & 
Whites)
Young Sample   
(Blacks & 
Whites)
Dependent Variable House Value House Value
Retirement & 
SS Income Mortgage Ratio
Dummy for Homosexual -40950.16*** -40022.63**  4717.46*** 1.880*  
(4073.93) (18070.98) (1829.36) (1.05)
Dummy for Gay 55230.03*** 72247.60**  -- --
(6468.21) (29387.42)
Age of Head 886.20*** 2274.18*** 762.15*** -0.478***
(191.81) (149.79) (19.31) (0.07)
Age of Partner 372.43** 585.50*** 449.89*** -0.07
(145.20) (94.71) (13.94) (0.05)
Education of Head -33422.47*** 2308.11*** 664.85*** -10.56***
(5387.54) (341.36) (54.53) (1.32)
Education of Partner -4808.14*** 1087.98*   1333.36*** -2.604***
(1718.40) (629.17) (90.35) (0.81)
1990 Income of Head  0.706*** 1.305*** 0.167*** 0.00002
(0.09) (0.06) (0.01) (0.00)
1990 Income of Partner 1.789*** 2.816*** -0.187*** -0.00009** 
(0.18) (0.26) (0.03) (0.00)
Dummy Move In 36412.66*** 12689.38*** 552.68*** -1.675***
(1030.91) (1592.09) (201.79) (0.31)
No. Children Head 36342.70*** -- -- -1.556
(1031.28) (1.23)
Labor Income of Head 0.871*** -- -- -0.00004***
(0.02) (0.00)
Household Size -- 2998.16*** -622.28*** --
(817.30) (99.81)
Disability of Head -- -8807.18*** -1782.87*** --
(1307.34) (215.16)
Disability of Partner -- -10178.02*** -1009.22*** --
(1425.60) (240.68)
Dummy for Black Head -- -- 1958.15 9.785***
(1245.01) (1.44)
Number of Observations 98,681 103,636 118,173 94,040
Estimated coefficients, S.E. (in paranthesis) clustered by recoded PUMA.
* ; ** ; *** significant at 10 %, 5%, 1 %. 
Regressions run with the covariates described in Section 3. 
Table 7: Effects of Being Homosexual versus Heterosexual Married on                                        
House Value and Retirement and Social Security Income: Elderly and Young Couples